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Razing the Citizen: Economic Inequality, Gender, 
and Marriage Tax Reform 
Martha T. McCluskey 
Social citizenship ideals fall not only outside the bounds of fundamental consti-
tutional rights, but also at the margins of plausible politics in the United States. 
Citizenship, in the prevailing view, confers the political and civil rights that ensure 
access to a democratic state and market. That view distinguishes rights to economic 
equality or socioeconomic security as peripheral, or even antagonistic, to the con-
cerns of democratic government. 
Indeed, over the last several decades, leading U.S. intellectuals and policy makers 
have designed and defended a citizenship vision linked to upward redistribution of 
economic resources. In this vision, economic inequality and widespread insecurity 
are necessary and natural to freedom and strength in state and market. Among 
mainstream leaders of law and politics, the response to this antisocial citizenship 
has been mostly acquiescence, obliviousness, or resignation, rather than sustained 
critical analysis or vigorous resistance. 
This chapter links the failure of social citizenship ideals in the United States to a 
broader weakness in citizenship ideals- a· weakness that is deeply related to gender 
ideology and practice. To better advance a vision of social citizenship, U.S. law 
and politics need a stronger vision, not just of economic equality, but of gender 
equality and of democracy in general. Feminist scholars have analyzed how ideas 
about gender help shape the common assumption that the costs of raising and sus-
taining capable, productive citizens are largely private family responsibilities. But 
ideas about gender also help to undermine egalitarian economic policy more gen-
erally. Gender ideology subtly shapes a vision where civic virtue ironically includes 
the project of razing citizens: turning democratic citizens into premodern subordi-
nates dependent on private power. I use the example of recent tax policy reforms 
focused on reducing the so-called marriage penalty to show how problematic ideas 
of gender, anticitizenship, and economic inequality have become entangled and 
how these must be reconsidered together to promote a meaningful vision of equal 
citizenship. 
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Social Citizenship in Theory 
Liberal Citizenship, Gender, and Economic Inequality 
Mainstream liberalism tends to frame social citizenship as an oxymoron. As a gen-
eral political philosophy, liberalism has many richly and widely diverging strands 
(including both liberal and conservative positions in contemporary U.S. politics). 
But these strands share a general ideal of a state and society where individuals retain 
personal freedom, while joining in public self-governance. Many differing versions 
of liberalism highlight autonomy in the state and market as the characteristic that 
makes the liberal individual deserving of democratic citizenship, as Martha Albert-
son Fineman has analyzed.' 
Early ideas of the liberal state distinguished the citizen capable of self-determi-
nation in market and state from the property, women, children, and servants under 
others' political and economic custody in the domestic sphere. This traditional 
liberal framework positions the right to social and economic support as a badge 
of dependent status squarely opposed to liberal citizenship. Though contemporary 
strands of liberalism typically embrace a more inclusive vision of citizenship (going 
beyond white male property owners), the original distinction continues to shape 
citizenship ideas. In particular, liberal theory continues to presume that the role of 
the state is to promote and protect individual autonomy, not individual dependence. 
By defining social citizenship as protection for personal economic security, distinct 
from political and civil liberty, liberalism sets up a bind in which social citizenship 
seems to undermine virtuous citizenship! 
This link between economic support and gender-based dependent status poses a 
number of challenges for contemporary advocates of progressive social citizenship. 
One problem is how to construct rights to social and economic security that include 
women (and others relegated to a subordinate status) without further confining them 
to a social sphere apart from and disadvantaged in state and market) The dispro-
portionately female labor of domestic caretaking tends to be defined in opposition 
to productive and rational action in state and market.4 As a result, women's con-
tributions to state and market are often viewed as so-called social relationships that 
1 Martha Albertson Fineman, The Autonomy Myth: A Theory of Dependency (New York: New Press, 
2004), at 18-:zz. 
1 See Martha T. McCluskey, "Efficiency and Social Citizenship: Challenging the Neoliberal Attack 
on the Welfare State,'' 78 Ind. L. f. 783, 8o5-o6 (2003). 
3 For discussions of this problem and its possible solutions, see Mary Anne Case, "How High the Apple 
Pie? A Few Troubling Questions About Where, Why, and How the Burden of Care for Children 
Should Be Shifted," 76 Chi-Kent L. Rev. 1753-86 (2001); Linda C. McClain, "Toward a Formative 
Project of Securing Freedom and Equality," 85 Cornell L. Rev. 1221,1251-56 (2ooo). 
4 See, e.g., Katharine Silbaugh, "Turning Labor into Love: Housework and the Law," 91 Nw. U. L. 
Rev. 1 (1996); Reva Siegel, "The Modernization of Marital Status Law: Adjudicating Wives' Rights to 
Earnings, 186o-193o," 82 Ceo. L. f. 2127, 2131 (1994). 
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do not merit political and economic recognition and reward.5 At times, however, 
government programs have targeted benefits to certain white women (especially 
those privileged by sexual, marital, and class status) to protect the productive work 
of "raising citizens."6 Nonetheless, even when caretaking labor has received public 
support as essential to political and market well-being, that support typically has 
been designed as social intervention that operates to limit even the more privileged 
domestic caretakers' indepvndent political and civil power.7 Whether devalued or 
revered, women's caretaking labor generally has been construed as outside (above 
or below) the normal operation and normal rights of market and state.8 
This gendered separation of the social from political and civil spheres stymies 
social citizenship goals more fundamentally, however. A vision - and divisiof!- -
of citizenship that identifies the social sphere with domestic caretaking tends to 
cast all social citizenship rights in a gendered light. If the social sphere is a place of 
feminized dependent care distinct from the political and civil spheres of independent 
citizenship, then social citizenship rights will appear to be protection for dependent 
status contrary to virtue and power in state and market. 
Following such logic, the judicial decisions of the early-twentieth-century Lochner 
era made social citizenship for independent workers unconstitutional, while carving 
out exceptions for women, some immigrants, and others whose incapacity for direct 
citizenship relegated them to paternalistic protection.9 Even when white women 
left home production and caretaking to became factory workers, the law constructed 
them as quintessential dependents deserving of social protection in lieu of equal 
citizenship.10 
Subsequent constitutional doctrine renounced Lochner's rule, opening the door 
to federal welfare state programs promoting economic equality in the New Deal and, 
in the 196os, the Great Society initiatives. However, Lochner's shadow continues to 
make egalitarian welfare policies appear suspect and stigmatizing, in part because the 
gendered separation between household dependents and state and market citizens 
at the heart of Lochner's logic has never been similarly renounced. State economic 
5 For discussion and criticism of this presumption, see Fineman, Autonomy Myth, 35-54; see also Linda 
C. McClain, "Care as a Public Value: Linking Responsibility, Resources and Republicanism," 76 
Chi-Kent L. Rev. 1673. 1677--90 (2o01). 
6 See Alan Pifer and Forrest Chisman, eds., soth Anniversary Edition of the Report of the Committee 
on Economic Security of 1935 and Other Basic Documents Relating to the Development of the Social 
Security Act 56 (Washington, DC: Project on the Federal Social Role, 1985, 1985). 
7 See Mimi Abramovitz, Regulating the Lives of Women: Social Welfare Policy From Colonial Times to 
the Present 318-19 (Boston: South End Press, 1988). 
8 See generally Frances E. Olsen, "The Family and the Market: A Study ofldeology and Legal Reform," 
96 Harv. L. Rev. 1497-578 (1983). 
9 See Lochner v. New York, 198 U.S. 45, 54-55 (1905) (striking down a New York labor law regulating 
bakers' hours as an unconstitutional infringement on economic liberty but distinguishing a regulation 
of miners' hours in part because of the miners' character). 
10 See Muller v. Oregon, 208 U.S. 412, 418-23 (1908) (upholding a minimum wage law for women and 
distinguishing Lochner on the ground of women's dependent status). 
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protection for workers is still sharply constrained out of concern that economic 
security will encourage weak, immature, and irresponsible citizens. In part, these 
concerns have led to programs that privilege groups of workers most identified with 
market independence, rather than domestic servitude.11 Unemployment benefits and 
old age social security, for example, have been structured to exclude or disadvantage 
many workers of color and women workers with caretaking responsibilities. But 
the constraints of Lochner's logic affect even economic security policies identified 
with masculinized, white, full-time manufacturing workers. For instance, popular 
media and policy makers have often denounced workers' compensation benefits and 
international trade protections for U.S. steelworkers, arguing that these discourage 
the self-reliant character traits that enhance civic and market virtue. 
Reviving Social Citizenship 
Advocates of social citizenship have tried to stretch the liberal frame that pits eco-
nomic support against good citizenship by pushing its boundaries in two directions. 
First, economic security can be imagined as a precondition, or floor, that will create 
capacity for meaningful citizenship in state and market." Second, following T. H. 
Marshall, economic security can be imagined as a postcondition, or ceiling.'3 In 
that second formulation, economic.rights are the final step toward perfecting liberal 
democracy, reached once equal political and civil rights are firmly behind us. 
But the gendered liberal framework lashes back against these attempts to stretch 
autonomous citizenship to include government support for economic well-being. 
First, as a precondition for political and civil rights, social citizenship reinforces the 
suspect status of those who claim it so that they appear to be marginal citizens with 
diminished capacity. When people need a boost up to virtuous citizenship, prevailing 
politics and theory tend to offer, not material comfort, but the disciplining hand of 
low-wage (or no-wage) service in market, prison, the military, or traditional marriage. 
·For example, in a book that helped shape late-twentieth-century welfare reforms, 
Charles Murray argued that twentieth-century U.S. social policy failed because 
public income support programs created incentives for a culture of economic 
dependence and criminality, especially among nonwhites. '4 He focused on what 
he described as a sharp rise in crime by black men beginning in the 196os, and he 
attributed this purported crime wave to insufficient punishment and discipline due to 
11 See Martha T. McCluskey, "The Politics of Economics in Welfare Reform," in Martha Albertson 
Fineman and Terence Dougherty, eds., Feminism Confronts Homo Economicus: Gender, Law and 
Society (Ithaca, NY: Cornell University Press, 2005), at 193, '99· 
12 See Cass R. Sunstein, The Second Bill of Rights: FDR's Unfinished Revolution and Why We Need It 
More Than Ever (New York: Basic Books, 2004), at 185 (giving public support for basic education as an 
example); Desmond S. King and Jeremy Waldron, "Citizenship, Social Citizenship and the Defence 
ofWelfare Provision," 18 Br. J. Pol. Sci. 415, .p6-27 (1988). 
'3 See T. H. Marshall, Citizenship and Social Class, and Other Essays (Cambridge: Cambridge University 
Press, 1950). 
14 Charles Murray, Losing Ground: American Social Policy 195o-1g8o (New York: Basic Books, 1984). 
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expanded welfare and civil rights protections that encouraged female-headed house-
holds, alternatives to the discipline of low-waged work, and new policies protecting 
criminal defendants (especially young black men) from incarceration. Murray advo-
cated "scrapping" public welfare programs to increase economic pressure on those in 
poverty, especially black Americans and single mothers, so that they would be more 
likely to participate in wage labor and to make different family choices.'5 Another 
prominent think tank writer, George Gilder, similarly used gender and racial ide-
ology to argue that federal income support will not lift families out of poverty.•6 
Gilder argued that economic support from the government will "destroy the key 
role and authority of the father," thereby fostering a "welfare culture" oflaziness and 
irresponsibility, especially among black Americans, Native Americans, and Latin 
American immigrants. According to Gilder, effective antipoverty policy must make 
welfare benefits austere and temporary to enco,urage "hard work."'7 
The second liberal rationale for social citizenship also invites a backlash against 
government programs promoting economic equality. If economic security is the 
icing on the cake after political and civil rights are assured, it will tend to appear 
to be an unaffordable luxury or unhealthy indulgence that weakens the state and 
market. By construing state and market freedom as fundamental for justice, and by 
making socioeconomic well-being separate and supplemental, this theory of social 
citizenship subtly reinforces the idea that economic inequality is a natural, benign, 
and often necessary part of the social order. And when state and market seem 
shaky, this argument for supplemental social citizenship supports the principle 
that economic resources must go first toward controlling those who threaten the 
presumed first-order political and civil liberties. The argument for economic rights 
as the final piece in democratic citizenship therefore risks enhancing a politics that 
pushes for more policing, more prisons, more military intervention in the public 
sphere, and more responsibility and sacrifice at home. What may result is a cycle that 
produces less freedom and security for most: more devastated individuals, homes, 
and communities, who produce more threats to others' state and market freedom, 
justifying more diversion of resources away from the separate social projects that 
would bring broad-based economic security. 
For example, in her study of California's prison system, Ruth Wilson Gilmore 
argues that a punitive "gulag" state replaced a more egalitarian welfare state in the 
late twentieth century, in response to a political and market crisis marked by Califor-
nia's industrial restructuring and job displacement, agricultural concentration and 
instability, decreasing federal funds, and rising poverty and immigration.18 From 
•5 Ibid., at 227-28. 
•
6 George Gilder, "The Coming Welfare Crisis," in Gwendolyn Mink and Rickie Solinger, eds., Welfare; 
A Documentary History of U.S. Policy and Politics (New York: New York University Press, 2003), at 
443-46 (reprinted from 11 Pol'y Rev. 25 [t98o]). 
'7 Ibid., at 443, 445-46. 
18 Ruth Wilson Gilmore, Golden Gulag: Prisons, Surplus, Crisis, and Opposition in Globalizing Califor-
nia (Berkeley: University of California Press, 2007), at4o-51, 7o-72, 83, '4o-.55· 
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1982 to 2000, California increased its prison population nearly 500 percent, making 
the Department of Corrections the largest state agency, consuming about 8 percent 
of the state's· general fund.'9 Gilmore analyzes this "prison fix" as establishing a 
system of"permanent crisis," in which dehumanization and isolation of"criminals" 
produces escalating fear, racism, and insecurity in state and market, which in turn 
diverts public and private funding from local infrastructure, education, social ser-
vices, and nonprison employment, thereby further exacerbating crime, inequality, 
and insecurity.20 
Conservative Challenges to Social Citizenship 
Two prongs of right-wing ideology and advocacy fueled a late-twentieth-century 
backlash against egalitarian socioeconomic policy in the United States that conti-
nues into the current century. The economic branch of right-wing politics, which 
claims to prioritize market freedom and a minimal state, often seems most directly 
opposed to social citizenship rights. Its "neoliberal" ideology (drawn from neoclassi-
cal economics) holds that an unfettered market, by definition, produces the greatest 
economic security for the most people, while government "intervention" to promote 
economic security ends up draining resources and enriching special interests at the 
expense of the most disadvantaged. This free-market doctrine was given a major 
boost in the 197os by a movement among wealthy business leaders to channel phi-
lanthropy into think tanks and scholarship that would promote "free enterprise" and 
oppose what they often characterized as the "socialist" policies of the New Deal and 
196os, including civil rights laws, welfare programs, and protections for consumers, 
labor, and the environment.21 The John M. Olin Foundation, for example, spent 
more than $68 million to establish the influential "law and economics" school of 
thought, which challenges the idea that legal rules should be designed to promote 
the goals of "fairness" or equality. 22 
The social branch of the political Right, in contrast, sometimes seems •more 
conducive to social citizenship goals. Neoconservative ideology sees the state as a 
legitimate source of moral authority capable of protecting the well-being of families 
and communities. Neoconservatives have promoted what they claim is a return to 
moral authority, for example, by promoting domestic policies restricting abortion 
and sex education and opposing same-sex marriage and by justifying U.S. foreign 
intervention on grounds of supposedly superior values and culture. 
23 To some extent, 
this moralistic vision seems to offer support for economic policies designed to restrain 
individual market greed for the benefit of social solidarity, civic virtue, and human 
'9 Ibid., at 7-10. 
20 See ibid., at 86, 107-13, 177-79. 
21 See Lewis H. Lapham, "Tentacles of Rage: The Republican Propaganda Mill, a Brief Hi
story," 
Harper's, Sept. 2004, at 31-41; John}. Miller, A Gift of Freedom: How the John M. Olin Foundation 
Changed America (New York: Encounter Books, 2004), 23, 32-37. 
22 Miller, A Gift of Freedom, at 62, 71, 81. 
'3 See Peter Steinfels, The NeoConservatives: The Men Who Are Changing America's Politics (New York: 
Simon & Schuster, 1979), at 53-56. 
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life and dignity. For example, it might appear that so-called family values advocates 
could be convinced to focus not only on restricting abortion and gay marriage, but 
also on increasing public funding for child care and children's health insurance. 
Despite the moralistic Right's frequent efforts to regulate community well-being, a 
closer examination shows how economic and social conservativism work together to 
undermine social citizenship goals. First, neoliberalism attacks social citizenship by 
making a gendered, unequal idea of the market the standard for virtuous "citizenship. 
Second, neoconservatism attacks social citizenship by making a gendered, unequal 
idea of the family the standard for virtuous citizenship. 
The economic prong of right-wing politics (neoliberalism) makes policies promot-
ing economic equality appear opposed to freedom and security. The conventional 
free-market tautology defines equality as coercive intervention in a voluntary mark~t 
where promotion of individual self-interest naturally maximizes resources for the 
good of all. The economic Right insists that those who lose out in the inegalitarian 
market will best achieve economic protection by policies that enhance that market's 
power to command behavior and to allocate gains. This theory explains that more 
jobs, and better economic choices, will not come from more rights for workers, 
more social spending on impoverished children, or more regulation of business to 
protect consumers, workers, or communities. Instead, the solution is policies that 
better attract and appease capital owners, who comprise the market's masters, and 
policies that better discipline the market's workers and consumers.24 
On the other hand, the social prong of right-wing politics makes egalitarian 
economic support appear antifamily. This view defines the virtuous, free, and secure 
family as one in which the promotion of individual sacrifice naturally maximizes 
resources for the good of society. The moralistic Right insists that those who lose out 
in the unequal market will best be helped by more fully embracing a hierarchical 
family model. For them, problems of economic insecurity are solved not by policies 
promoting equality in government and market, but by policies that remove state 
and market impediments to family and religious authority to recognize natural 
inequalities. In this view, true security for the most economically vulnerable comes . 
from attracting and appeasing husbands, or from submission to the discipline of 
earthly or divine fatherhood, not from government resources. True economic power, 
according to social conservativism, results not from challenging the masters of market 
or state, but instead from enhancing the authority of family and religious masters 
over dependent others.25 In this view, if impoverished pregnant women lack the 
24 For some examples of this line of reasoning, see generally Daniel Yergin and Joseph Stanislaw, The 
Commanding Heights: The Battle Between Government and the Marketplace That Is Remaking the 
Modem World (New York: Touchstone, 1998); Thomas L. Friedman, The Lexus and the Olive Tree: 
Understanding Globalization (New York: Farrar, Straus and Giroux, 1999). For criticisms of this 
neoliberal challenge to social citizenship, see generally McCluskey, "Efficiency and Social Citizen-
ship." 
>5 For an example of this kind of argument, from an affiliate of the right-wing Family Resear.ch Council, 
see Allan Carlson, Fractured Generations: Crafting a Family Policy for Twenty-First-Century America 
(New Brunswick, NJ: Transaction, 2005). For a criticism of family values arguments that dismiss the 
problem of economic inequality, see Fineman, Autonomy Myth, at 89-94· 
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economic and social resources to raise healthy children, then they deserve not 
more income, public services, or better child care to help them avoid abortion, 
but stronger controls on their sexual behavior, stronger pressure to put work before 
family, and more punitive government intervention in their families through the 
child protection and criminal justice systems!6 
Together, both intertwining branches of the Right idealize an illusion of citizen-
ship as a privilege linked to independence from the state, grounded in the mythic 
free market and the mythic self-sufficient family.z7 And both economic and social 
strands of the Right draw on gender ideology to legitimate and promote this antiso-
cial citizenship vision. The "nanny state" epithet is used by both the libertarian and 
moralistic Right to disparage the welfare state and the regulatory state.z
8 The "nanny 
state" slur expresses the idea that social citizenship is an oxymoron not only because 
it makes autonomous citizens into coddled dependents, but also because it makes 
autonomous men into dependent women, children, or servants. 
The "nanny state" metaphor not only disparages social citizenship, but also sug-
gests that both economic and social strands of conservativism sow doubt about the 
value of democratic citizenship itself. This "nanny state" metaphor imagines that 
the public order depends on a gendered (and classed and raced) status hierarchy: 
we know government and market have failed if female (or feminized) servants make 
the rules. 
Gendered Challenges to Democratic Citizenship 
The success of the Right's ideas shows that the gendered liberal citizenship frame-
work has problems that go beyond disadvantaging socioeconomic equality in gen-
eral, and caretaking women in particular. Gender ideology also works to undermine . 
social citizenship ideals by casting doubt on democratic citizenship more deeply 
and broadly. The prevailing vision of political and civil success not only marginal-
izes the work of "raising citizens." More insidiously, the prevailing view promotes 
the gender-infused assumption that razing citizens is fundamental to state and mar-
ket well-being; that is, recent policy and ideology have subtly (or not) revived and 
enhanced a vision in which democratic citizenship itself is antagonistic to political 
and civil virtue. 
On the surface, the mainstream commitment to liberalism rejects an older 
social structure centered on master and servant to embrace a vision of free, self-
governing citizens. But mainstream liberalism's uneasiness with social citizenship is 
intertwined with a continued reliance on assumptions of a hierarchical, authoritarian 
order limited by tradition-bound status. 
26 See generally Rickie Solinger, Beggars and Choosers: How the Politics of Choice Shapes Adoption, 
Abortion and Welfare in the United States (New York: Hill and Wang, 2001). 
27 See Fineman, Autonomy Myth, at 31-34· 
28 See Martha T. McCluskey, "Thinking With Wolves: Left Legal Theory After the Right's Rise," 54 
Buffalo L. Rev. 1191, 1293 (2007 ). 
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Opposition to social citizenship draws on and interconnects with a preliberal 
and premodern political ideal that models government on the unequal household, 
where legitimate authority comes from a master's governance oflegally dependent 
family and servants. As Markus Dubber explains, Western traditions of democratic 
sovereignty not only permitted, but required, a system of inequality in governance.29 
For the majority, who were household members, rather than household heads, in 
early European versions of democracy, virtuous governance required submission 
and sacrifice to a household status hierarchy. The traditional citizen was indepen-
dent and virtuous to the extent he controlled, protected, and represented others 
without independent political and market power. That political order was gendered: 
the status of head of household was linked to masculinity (as well as to race, national-
ity, sexuality, economic class, and other characteristics). For example, Blackstone's 
commentaries identified the king as the "father" of his people, explaining that "the 
individuals of the state, like members of a well-governed family are bound to ... be 
decent, industrious, and inoffensive in the respective stations."3° Dubber argues that 
this ideal of patriarchal governance was not rejected by the change from monarchy 
to liberal republican government in the United States, but instead was incorporated 
within itY Current controversies over law and government in the United States con-
tinue to raise the fundamental question of whether American government should be 
a democracy of household members, where unequal and dependent status requires 
most to submit to policing by their autonomous superiors, or whether American 
government constitutes a democracy of persons equally capable of self-government. 
Gender ideology helps perpetuate that older antidemocratic ideal by identifying 
mastery and servitude with the natural or at least normal and benign characteristics 
of biological difference within the private family, rather than as a public rejection 
of democracy. For example, George Lakoff analyzes how an antiliberal view of 
the family fuels "conservative" opposition to "liberal" efforts to promote equality in 
the United StatesY Lakoff explains that the political Right builds popular support 
by tapping into a widespread belief that the good family is characterized by sharp 
gender differentiation, with a father responsible for authority, discipline,' and pro-
tection over dependent, obedient women and children,33 In the conservative view, 
the "strict father" family has become the primary metaphor for the state, creating a 
frame in which inequality is a virtuous correcting force rewarding successful dom-
inance, while protecting and punishing unsuccessful dependents. Lakoff traces the 
'9 See Markus Dirk Dubber, The Police Power: Patriarchy and the Foundations of American Government 
(New York: Columbia University Press, zoos), at 5· 
3o See ibid., at 49· 
3• See ibid., at 83--<]3 (describing Jefferson's vision of transforming America from a hierarchical monar-
chy); see also ibid., at 217 (concluding that Jefferson's effort needs to be revived today because an 
unexamined patriarchal vision of governance continues to ground American law). 
3' See generally George Lakoff, Moral Politics: How Liberals and Conservatives Think (Chicago: Uni-
versity of Chicago Press, znd ed. zooz). 
33 George Lakoff, Don't Think of an Elephant: Know Your Values and Frame the Debate (White River 
Jet., Vf: Chelsea Green, zoo4), at 6-1o. 
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opposing "liberal" political vision to a sharply contrasting ideal of the "nu
rturant par-
ent" family, which encourages freedom, gender equality, fairness, nego
tiation, and 
caring. 
Lakoff explains that for people who identify with the "strict father" famil
y model, 
government economic support appears immoral and harmful because 
it interferes 
with the strict, hierarchical rule that they believe best protects people from
 a danger-
ous world. But this conservative "strict father" model leads beyond rejection of social 
citizenship principles to make equal political and civil rights appear p
roblematic. 
If virtue comes from using punishment and reward to maintain strong c
ontrol over 
dependents, both in the family and in the state and market, then justice and moral-
ity will be consistent with substantial authoritarian rule and unequal b
enefits and 
burdens in state and society. In this "strict father" model, the discipline
 of a harsh, 
unequal market and state appropriately fosters both the coldhearted, unc
ompromis-
ing calculation and the irrational, submissive devotion that establish the m
orality and 
power necessary to defend home, business, and nation from ruthless opp
onents.34 
Advocating Meaningful Equal Citizenship 
Four not-so-easy steps might help proponents of economic equality bette
r challenge 
the framework that defeats economic equality and gender equity and 
that under-
mines the very idea of democratic citizenship as well. 
First and foremost, we must reject the separation of political, civil, and social 
rights. Economic protection is neither the floor below nor the ceiling 
above civil 
and political rights, but the core that gives those rights substance and stru
cture. Who 
has political and civil rights determines who has the power to direct soci
al resources 
to meet his or her interests, according to his or her ideals and identities
. The ideal 
of formal political and civil rights divorced from substantive power an
d material 
benefit is a myth. When political and civil rights are insufficient to
 command 
socioeconomic protections, that signifies not just the failure of social citizenship, 
but the failure of political and civil citizenship as well. The power 
to share in 
governing state and market includes the power to define and enact one'
s economic 
interests as fundamental virtues, public necessities, and market efficien
cies, ·rather 
than as redistribution, as luxuries, or as compensation for incapacity.35 
Second, advocates of economic equality should not frame the issue as 
a debate 
between security, solidarity, and regulation, on one hand, and risk, ind
ividualism, 
and autonomy, on the other.36 The individual autonomy and insecurity
 claimed by 
current state and market authorities is rhetoric more than reality. Instead
, we should 
34 Ibid., at 8-10. 
:>5 See Martha T. McCluskey, "The lllusion of Efficiency in Workers
' Compensation 'Reform,"' 50 
Rutgers L. Rev. 657, 918-20 (1998). 
36 See Martha T. McCluskey, "Rhetoric of Risk and the Redistribution
 of Social Insurance," in Tom 
Baker and Jonathan Simon, eds., Embracing Risk: The Changing Culture of Insurance and Responsi-
bility (Chicago: University of Chicago Press, 2002), at 146, 164-66. 
Razing the Citizen 
reframe the debate as the question of the distribution of security and freedom: who 
gets protection and who gets risk, and whose interests are advanced and impeded by 
regulation and social responsibilities. The myth of autonomy covers up a gendered 
double standard of independence, as Fineman shows.37 The problem is who deserves 
substantive citizenship, not whether citizenship encompasses material support. 
Third, arguments for economic equality should challenge the opposition to eco-
nomic equity as a movement against political and civil citizenship, not just against 
economic citizenship. Both prongs of conservatism promote a restructuring of state, 
market, and family to encourage control, risk, and coercion for most people as the 
means of securing power for a few. The illusion of freedom and decentralized power 
in market and family serves to excuse and support a movement toward increasing 
state authoritarianism that is eroding liberal citizenship. The rising economic inse-
curity for the majority in the United States is about a systematic increase in inequality 
in voting rights, an increase in corruption of democracy by campaign financing and 
lobbying, and the barriers to representation of diverse viewpoints in the media and 
in the legislative process- as well as other major flaws in political rights. 
Fourth, arguments for economic equality should challenge the prevailing culture 
of gender difference. Policies of economic security will face popular stigma and 
political constraint as long as sacrifice, economic vulnerability, and unproductive-
ness are distinctly feminine virtues, while individual economic mastery over more 
vulnerable others is the sign of mature masculinity. To break down the ideological 
separation between political, economic, and social power, it will be necessary to 
challenge the assumption that this separation reflects a natural, reasonable, or trivial 
gender division. 
Social Citizenship in Public Policy: Marriage Tax Reform 
Taxation is one of the most important policy arenas affecting the questions of eco-
nomic equality and citizenship in general. Social citizenship rights depend, to a 
large extent, on determinations of how much economic gain individuals must share 
with the state, and how that obligation to the state is distributed among citizens. The 
early-twentieth-century introduction of the income tax, followed by the New Deal 
payroll tax system for social security, helped support some federal social spending 
and regulation that led to increased economic equality in the mid-century United 
States. 
Feminists have explored how the twentieth-century United States' steps toward 
social citizenship were limited by a gendered, racialized vision of economic pro-
ductivity that privileged formal market work, typically done by white men. But 
along with work-based income support and protections for workers' rights, mid-
twentieth-century policy instituted a marriage benefit in the income tax code that 
(at least implicitly) addressed the economic contributions of some women's informal 
>7 See Fineman, Autonomy Myth, at 33-53. 
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domestic labor. This marriage-based benefit, however, has troubling implications 
both for women and for social citizenship in general. 
Economic Support as Gendered Citizenship 
After 1948, the switch from individual to joint taxation of married couples (combined 
with favorable marital tax rates) produced a so-called marriage bonus for well-off 
breadwinner-homemaker married couples.38 By treating married taxpayers as a unit, 
rather than as two separate taxpayers, a relatively high earning breadwinner married 
to a n~nearning or low-earning spouse could split his (very rarely, her39) market 
income in half, as if it were really earned by two equal earners. With this 1948 
change to joint marital taxation, the couple with a husband earning $~oo,ooo and a 
non earning wife was taxed as if both earned $ so,ooo. Because of progressive tax rates, 
the total tax owed by two individual (unmarried) $so,ooo earners added together 
would be lower than the total taxes owed by the combination of one (unmarried) 
$wo,ooo earner taken together with another taxpayer earning zero. 
Progressive tax rates normally reward equality and create incentives to reduce 
inequality. This 1948 change to marriage-based taxation effectively created an excep-
tion to the progressivity rule: it allowed unequal earners, if married, to be rewarded 
as if they were equal. The as if is important- it was designed to protect high-earning 
husbands from incentives to-in fact equalize title to family resources.4° This system 
effectively allowed a spouse with significant taxable income to use a nonearning or 
low-earning spouse as a tax shelter that would substantially reduce the family's tax 
liability. 
Some have claimed that this marriage bonus furthers women's social citizenship 
because it has acted as support for family caretaking. It even privileges homemaking 
to some extent, giving greater support to taxpaying units in which one spouse forgoes 
substantial market income than to single people or married couples without a primary 
homemaker.41 
But as feminist critics noted from the beginning, this tax-based system of economic 
support f~r caretaking is founded on a vision opposed to women's political and 
market citizenship.42 This tax support for homemaking labor was enacted effectively 
to impede women's ability to bargain independently for direct compensation for that 
38 For a discussion of the 1948 tax law change creating the marriage bonus, see Edward J. McCaffrey, 
Taxing Women (Chicago: University of Chicago Press, 1997), at 54-57· 
39 Data from the pre-1948 system show thai in 1918, only 1.4 percent of wives earned enough to be subject 
to the income tax individually (exceeding the zero-tax bracket), and by 1939, less than 7 percent of 
wives did so. See ibid., at 31. 
4° See ibid., at 51-54; see also Carolyn C. Jones, "Split Income and Separate Spheres: Tax Law and 
Gender Roles in the 1940s," 6 Law and History Rev. 259, 294-96 (1988). 
4' See Anne L. Alstott, 'Tax Policy and Feminism: Competing Goals and Institutional Choices," 96 
Co/urn. L. Rev. 2001, 2015-18 (1996). 
42 See Alice Kessler-Harris, In Pursuit of Equity: Women, Men, and the Quest for Economic Citizenship 
in 2oth-Century America (New York: Oxford University Press, 2001), at 188-<}8. 
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household labor. The mid-twentieth-century change treating married women not as 
taxpaying individuals, but as part of a unit consisting of one taxpayer and one spouse, 
evoked earlier centuries' legal doctrine of coverture, by which a woman largely lost 
her separate legal identity upon marriage, surrendering independent citizenship for 
the cover of a husband, who assumed full ownership of the woman's property and 
income.43 Consistent with that tradition, and rejecting the previous half-century of 
income tax practice, the marriage bonus recognized homemakers not as individuals 
directly contributing to the state or to the family, but as wives, whose income and 
obligations are only counted through and claimed by their taxpaying breadwinner 
spouse. 
More materially, this tax support for marital homemaking is not tailored to support 
traditionally female dependent caretaking. This tax advantage targets marital home-
making regardless of dependents, and separate from other, less generous, dependent 
caretaking protections. For that reason, the marriage bonus system can be viewed 
·as a policy aimed at supporting "affluent husband care": it recognizes, revives, and 
subsidizes the traditional coverture duty of wives (or gender-neutral spouses) to forgo 
market earnings to serve their husbands for no pay. And it affirms the traditional 
view that the self-governing citizen is one who can command domestic service not 
as an equal bargainer in a free market, but as a master based on marital status. 
Reframing Social Support as Gendered Privilege 
By criticizing this family tax policy as an affluent husband care subsidy, this analysis 
follows Fineman's call to shift the focus from disadvantage to privilege and to 
excavate the history of affirmative support for substantive citizenship.44 Identifying 
this privilege and the continuing political interests behind it helps to challenge the 
conventional wisdom that this marriage bonus is a relic reflecting now-outdated 
demography, a view that fails to explain why it has not only persisted, but increased, 
as the married breadwinner-homemaker couple has become less representative of 
American families. 
In addition, by identifying this tax policy as a problem of unequal power and 
privilege, rather than of unequal need for support, we can shed light on how to 
escape the tough trade-offs that confound the question of economic security for 
family caretakers in the tax system. Many have framed the marriage tax question as 
a dilemma about whose needs for economic support are stronger: market-working 
versus homemaking wives; single versus married taxpayers; men versus women; those 
who satisfy formal definitions of dependency versus those who can prove functional 
dependency. · 
Better to promote women's equal social citizenship, this affluent husband care sub-
sidy should not be eliminated, but instead should be extended to support caretaking 
43 See Hendrik Hartog, Man and Wife in America: A History (Cambridge, MA: Harvard University Press, 
2000), at u5-22. 
44 See Fineman's exposition in Chapter n. 
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more equitably for the majority of nonaffluent earners, regardless of marital or family 
status, and regardless of whether their domestic care comes from market or non mar-
ket labor. This would involve, first, taxing people as individuals, rather than as a mari-
tal unit; second, expanding the progressivity of the tax code to provide more equitable 
tax relief to support the caretaking needs oflow-income and modest-income workers 
and dependents; and third, structuring tax and other laws formally to recognize and 
enforce intrafamily exchanges of income and assets for informal family care. 
Furthermore, by recognizing the tax system's long-standing privilege for affluent 
husband care, we may better defend government support for dependent care as 
continuing a normal and traditional relationship among between state, family, and 
market- rather than as a supplement to state and market. The husband care subsidy 
shows that the well-off, two-parent marital family held up as the model of self-
sufficiency actually has depended on substantial governmental support. Equalizing 
and extending that economic support to others will not simply expand "dependency," 
but will give more people more independent power to negotiate their interests in 
market and family. 
Economic Privilege as Antidemocratic Citizenship 
Recent tax reforms provide an example of the links between opposition to social 
citizenship and opposition to democratic citizenship. In 2001 and 2003, Congress 
enacted significant, much publicized reforms to this long-standing marriage tax 
system. But these reforms did not end the affluent husband care subsidy otherwise 
known as the marriage bonus. Instead, they ended the so-called marriage penalty for 
middle income taxpayers. This penalty was actually the result of a 1969 change to 
the income-splitting rate for married couples: instead of treating married taxpayers as 
if they were fully equal earners, the 1969 reform treated married taxpayers' income 
as if it were divided somewhat less equally - as if one spouse earned 70 percent 
and .the other 30 percent, rather than as if each earned 50 percent of the couple's 
joint income.45 This change somewhat reduced the so-called marriage bonus- or 
affluent husband care subsidy- thereby softening the blow to affluent husbands who 
divorced their tax-shelter wives. 
But this change actually penalized equal-earning married couples because it 
meant they were taxed at a higher rate than if they were single. Remember that 
the 1948 marital income splitting system basically altered the normal progressivity 
of the tax system to reward unequal-earning couples as if they were equal earners: 
the co.uple with one $wo,ooo earner and one nonearner was taxed at the lower rate 
applied to two $5o,ooo earners. Under that 1948 joint marital taxation system, those 
who really were equal earners did not receive a so-called marriage bonus. Instead, 
the 1948-1969 scheme left equal-earning married couples with the same standard 
progressive tax rates as single persons. Under that older system, married couples 
45 See McCaffery, Taxing Women, at 63-69. 
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whose earnings were already equal could not gain a tax shelter by attributing a higher 
earner's income to a lower-income spouse, but they did not lose the normal benefits 
of the progressive tax rates. The 1969 marriage tax law change had the perverse effect 
of taking away the normally progressive tax treatment of these equal-earning married 
couples. Instead, it treated equal-earning marriages as if the earnings were somewhat 
unequal- creating a marriage penalty for many two-earning couples. After 1969, for 
example, the husband and wife who each earned $so,ooo would have been treated 
as if they earned roughly $7o,ooo and $3o,ooo, effectively penalizing them with the 
steeper tax rate associated with a higher-earning taxpayer. 
As dual-earning marriages became a mainstay of the increasingly struggling middle 
class in the 1970s, this regressive tax penalty became a particular target of criticism. 
Remember, however, that it was never really a marriage penalty, but always "more 
specifically an equal-earning marriage penalty, and it coexisted with the bonus for 
higher-income unequal marriages - the affluent husband care subsidy. The series 
of reforms from 2001 through 2oos largely removed this equal-earning penalty at 
middle income levels. As a result, those recent reforms might seem to take at least 
a small step toward more substantive gender equity and economic equity in the 
tax system, providing a positive example of the possibilities for social citizenship. 
However, the bigger picture is grimmer. 
The so-called marriage penalty was eliminated by expanding the tax bonus for 
unequal-earning couples - the affluent husband care subsidy- to the higher levels 
of the 1948-1969 period.46 The recent reforms replace the 1969 policy of taxing 
marital income as if it were earned somewhat unequally (split in a 70/30 ratio 
between spouses) with one taxing marital income as if it were earned on a fully 
equal basis (a so/so split). This means that those married couples with the most 
unequal spousal division of income can shelter more of the higher-earning spouse's 
income under the lower-earning spouse's tax rates. For example, a husband earning 
$wo,ooo will get taxed as a $so,ooo earner (rather than as a $7o,ooo earner under 
the 1969 scheme) when married to a wife without taxable income. 
By replacing the fiction of a 7o/3o marital income split with a fiction of a so/so 
marital income split, the recent reforms claim to alleviate equal earners' marriage 
penalty because these married couples no longer lose the progressive rates normally 
available for their individual earnings. Two $so,ooo earners now will have the same 
combined taxes, whether married or unmarried, because marriage no longer effec-
tively redistributes marital income to meet the more unequal, and therefore more 
steeply taxed, 70/30 division. But these recent reforms still privilege unequal-earning 
married couples compared to dual-earning marrried couples and also compared to 
unmarried taxpayers. By expanding the income-splitting tax shelter so that unequal-
earning married couples can shift more of the high-earner's income to a lower tax 
bracket, the recent reforms increase the tax bonus to breadwinners who marry a 
46 See Susan Kalinka, "Highlights of the 2003 Jobs and Growth Tax Relief Reconciliation Act: Economic 
Stimulus or Long-Term Disaster?," 64 La. L Rev. 219, 229-30 (2004). 
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non-earning or low-earning homemaker. An individual earning $10o,ooo with a 
spouse who specializes in unpaid homemaking, for example, could save over $6,ooo 
in annual taxes compared to an unmarried person with the same income (using 
zoo8 tax rates). In contrast, an individual earning $5o,ooo who marries a spouse who 
combines homemaking with $5o,ooo in market earnings will not get any tax sav-
ings upon marriage. This tax privilege for unequal-earning marriages is particularly 
problematic because those couples are typically better off economically compared 
to dual-earning couples with the same joint formal market income. Dual-earning 
married couples are likely to work more hours per couple to earn the same market 
earnings, leaving less time or money for household labor and leisure.47 Compared 
to both single taxpayers and dual-earning married couples, married breadwinner-
homemaker couples with comparable income are likely to benefit from substantial 
informal productive labor and economic security provided by full-time homemakers 
but not counted as taxable income. By effectively taxing the $wo,ooo breadwinner 
with a non-earning homemaker spouse as if they were two $5o,ooo earners, the 
current marital tax system rejects the progressive principle that $10o,ooo is taxed 
less if it represents the market earnings of two or more workers rather than one. By 
directing tax support to unequal-earning married couples, but not to taxpayers filing 
singly or to dual-breadwinners, the recent current marriage tax system continues to 
exclude the most burdened middle-class taxpayers from the biggest middle-class tax 
break. 
This inequity shows the power of the right-wing, two-pronged attack on social cit-
izenship, in the tax code and beyond. Protection for unequal family status becomes 
a political substitute for meaningful economic equality. To address the increasing 
economic insecurity that has eroded the breadwinner-homemaking family, the Right 
offers increased privileges for that family. Struggling, dual-earning married couples 
get relief from penalties based on their formal marital status, without getting substan-
tial support for their actual economic vulnerability. According to social conservative 
arguments, economic privileges for the breadwinner-homemaker marital family are 
good for society overall because that is the family that is the model of self-sufficiency 
and public virtue.48 That logic helps justify and normalize the economic vulnerabil-
ity of dual-earning married couples and single taxpayers as the product of personal 
choice and character, rather than as the result of exclusion from state and market 
privileges. 
Although the focus on marriage penalty relief suggests a largely moral victory 
for the social conservatives, a more complete view of the recent tax policy changes 
shows that the most substantial impact of the reforms went toward advancing the 
economic prong of the conservative backlash. After all, the real action in the recent 
47 See Julie A. Nelson, Feminism, Objectivity and Economics (New York: Routledge, 1996), 104-o5. 
48 See Wade F. Horn, "The Marriage 'Bonus' Offers Little Tax Relief," Washington Times, Aprilu, 20oo, 
at E2. 
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tax reforms of 2001 and 2003 has been massive tax cuts for the very rich49 - in the 
name of shrinking state interference in free market earnings. In dollar amounts, 
those tax cuts for the rich far outstripped the gains to the middle class from marriage 
penalty relief. Some have suggested that the marriage reforms acted like a bribe 
that got enough of the middle class to accept the massive upward redistribution of 
wealth through the tax system.5° This would suggest a toned-down vision of social 
citizenship - limited economic support is possible for the majority if that support 
is tailored to accommodate a right-wing moral ideal of an unequal family along 
with a right-wing economic ideal of an unequal market skewed to advantage the very 
richY 
But a closer look at these tax reforms shows an even worse picture for social 
citizenship in particular, and for liberal citizenship in general. Marriage remains 
penalized for many equal-earning couples, especially in lower-income families, who 
are supposedly the primary targets of pro-marriage policyY Moreover, the marriage 
penalty relief these recent reforms offer to the middle class is, to a large extent, 
temporary and illusory: just as these income tax reforms go into effect, the regular 
income tax will no longer apply to large portions of the married middle class.53 That 
is because of an effective shift in the alternative minimum tax, originally designed 
to close loopholes protecting the rich, but which soon will apply primarily and 
increasingly to the middle class and not the rich. Indeed, some tax experts suggest 
that the alternative minimum tax is now perversely aimed at increasing taxes on the 
middle class to make up the revenue lost from upper-income tax cuts.54 And how 
does this alternative minimum tax work to increase taxes on the middle class? In 
part, it does so by eliminating the tax benefits for marriage and for dependent care 
that would otherwise help the middle-class family.55 
In short, what we get from this picture is not simply a constrained, moralistic, and 
gendered vision of social citizenship, but a deceptive vision of social citizenship, or 
more precisely a vision that replaces social citizenship with upper class power and 
privilege in state and market. In this vision, gender ideology serves to distract and 
divide the middle class to allow the upward redistribution of wealth. 
But these tax reforms also suggest another shift in gendered citizenship. The 
affluent husband care subsidy of the second half of the twentieth century reflected 
49 See Lawrence A. Zelenak, "The Declining Progressivity of the Federal Income Tax," in Paul D. 
Carrington and Trina Jones, eds., Law and Class in America: Trends Since the Cold War (New York: 
New York University Press, zoo6), at 163--90. 
so See ibid., at 183. 
5' Ezra Klein, "The Rise of the Republicrats," American Prospect, Aug. 13, zoo6. 
5' See Adam Carasso and Eugene Steuerle, "The Hefty Penalty on Marriage Facing Many Households 
With Children," 1s Future of Children 1S7• 1S9, 163 (zoos). 
53 See Leonard E. Burman eta!., The Expanding Reach of the Individual Alternative Minimum Tax 
(Washington, DC: Urban Institute and Brookings Institute, zoos), at 4-6. 
54 See Zelenak, "Declining Progressivity," at 174. 
55 See Jane G. Gravelle, The Individual Alternative Minimum Tax: Interaction With Marriage Penalty 
Relief and Other Tax Cuts (Washington, DC: Congressional Research Service, zo01), at CRS-7. 
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and reinforced an ideal of deserving citizenship represented by the married, white, 
male, upper-middle-class worker, whose capacity for governance is established by his 
status as master of the household, entitled to unpaid domestic service. The twenty-
first-century tax system is perhaps taking steps toward replacing this ideal: in place 
of the affluent husband care subsidy, we have what might be called the "superrich 
capital care subsidy." 
Perhaps the ideal citizen on the horizon is not the married, affluent breadwinner, 
but the wealthy capital owner, who, as master of the state and market, asserts entitle-
ment to the service and sacrifice of both market workers and family caretakers. In the 
early twenty-first century, the promise of economic and political power associated 
with middle-class status in the United States often proves hollow, even as poverty 
and extreme wealth increase.s6 
Recent tax policy changes track twenty-first-century changes in many other areas 
of U.S. government policy at the local, national, and international levels, as the 
burdens and benefits of government and market have shifted to increase protection 
for a superrich minority at the expense of most others. 57 Income from wage work, 
government benefits, and retirement is often less secure and more meager. 5
8 Rising 
burdens of housing, health care, and education have squeezed the middle class as 
well as the poor, and the route toward the American dream typically includes a 
dual-earning household and a high debt load. But many of these dreams end in 
bankruptcy, as this path offers little cushion against crisis in work, family, or health. 
Between 1989 and 1999, the number of women filing for bankruptcy increased over 
6oo percent, and bankruptcy expert Elizabeth Warren concludes that the data show 
that raising children is a major economic risk factor for married parents as well 
as for single women.59 The chance of falling from the middle class into poverty 
has increased substantially since the 196os and 1970s; more than half of American 
children spend at least a year in poverty before reaching age eighteen, and more than 
half of all American adults can expect to spend at least a year in poverty between the 
ages of twenty-five and seventy-five, according to sociologist Mark Rank.
60 Women 
work an annual average of 200 hours more than in the mid-197os; men work an 
average of 100 hours more; most American families have replaced savings with net 
debt; bankruptcy (especially in the middle class) has soared; public services - such 
as education and infrastructure spending- have been starved over several decades in 
favor of spending on warfare, prisons, and business subsidies; and Americans sacrifice 
56 See Robert Perrucci and Earl Wysong, The New Class Society: Goodbye American Dream? (New York: 
Rowman and Littlefield, 2nd ed. 2002), at 3-34. 
57 See McCluskey, "Rhetoric of Risk." 
58 See generally Jacob S. Hacker, The Great Risk Shift: The Assault on American Jobs, Families, Health 
Care, and Retirement (and How You Can Fight Back) (New York: Oxford University Press, 2oo6). 
59 See Elizabeth Warren and Amelia Warren Tyagi, The Two-Income Trap: Why Middle-Class Mothers 
and Fathers Are Going Broke (New York: Basic Books, 2003), at 5-6. 
60 Hacker, "Great Risk Shift," at 32, citing Mark Robert Rank, One Nation, Underprivileged, Why 
American Poverty Affects Us All (New York: Oxford University Press, 2004), at 94-
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not only leisure, but sleep, to the growing demands of work and home.6' At the same 
time, lawmakers at the local, national, and international levels typically shape policy 
in direct response to the demands of their superrich funders, exemplified by the rise in 
local "corporate welfare" spending and privatization,62 the influence of well-funded 
corporate lobbyists and wealthy campaign donors in national government,63 and 
international governance (in institutions like the World Trade Organization and the 
International Monetary Fund) prioritizing protections for multinational corporate 
profits at the expense of labor, environment, and human rights.64 President Barack 
Obama's election and economic stimulus legislation have spurred hopes that new 
economic policy will increase support for the middle class. Yet this mobilization 
for change coincides with a financial crisis in which newly uncovered threats of 
staggering losses from elite profit-seeking give those elites more power to dernand 
further protection from taxes along with massive increases in government financial 
support. 
Rather than turning wives from servants into citizens, perhaps recent marriage 
tax policy reflects and reinforces a trend toward turning most citizens (regardless 
of gender or marital status) into "wives" of capital. Reminiscent of the traditional 
coverture doctrine giving husbands the right to control women's power to own, earn, 
and govern, perhaps law and ideology are moving back toward a broader premodern 
ideal, in which a small group of wealthy property owners and governors are entitled 
to assert cover over most workers and families, whose power to secure the fruits of 
their labor is increasingly at the discretion of the rich masters, instead of being a 
right fundamental to a healthy state, family, and market. 
6
' See Robert H. Frank, Falling Behind: How Rising Inequality Harms the Middle Class (Berkeley: 
University of California Press, 2007), at 78--86. 
62 See generally Greg LeRoy, The Great American Jobs Scam: Corporate Tax Dodging and the Myth of 
Job Creation (San Francisco: Berrett-Koehler, 2005). 
63 For data on the influence of money in U.S. politics, see Center for Responsive Politics, "OpenSecrets," 
available at http://www.opensecrets.org/ (accessed Sept. 1, 2oo8). 
64 See, e.g., Jeff Faux, The Global Class War: How America's Bipartisan Elite Lost Our Future- and 
What It Will Take to Win It Back (Hoboken, NJ: John Wiley, 2oo6) (reporting on the politics and 
economics of the North American Fr~e Trade Agreement). 
